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THE IDEA OF FEUDALISM IN CHINA, AND 
ITS APPLICABILITY TO SONG SOCIETY 
Colin Jeffcott 
An attempt to analyze the applicability of the idea of 
"feudalism" to China is perhaps best begun with a look at its use 
by historians from the People's Republic. It is there, after all, 
that the term has by far its widest currency. Yet it must be said 
that the bulk of this body of historical writing is of little use in 
attaining clarity about the concept. A set, orthodox scheme of 
historical progression -. whether one calls it Stalinist or Maoist 
- has been required of Chinese historians since 1949. Primitive, 
slave and feudal society are universal stages of development for 
all human societies. The direction of development d all feudal 
societies (including China's) is towards capitalism (Mao's emphasis 
on this helped to generate the 1950's literature on "the sprouts 
of capitalism" to be found in Ming and Qing China). Late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century China was "semi-feudal and 
semi-colonial". Within such a framework many specific points 
of detail or particular episodes might be investigated, often in 
surprisingly traditional terms. The evidence might be gone through 
for progressive technical and social developments, often in a highly 
nationalist spirit. But it is not surprising that in more general 
discussion of the history of society, much of what was written 
in the first decade or so of the regime is in fact scholastic debate 
over the timing of turning points.! 
After a period of more than a decade of silence or propagandist 
distortion, serious historical work has revived in the People's 
Republic since 1977. The effects of long isolation from colleagues 
both inside and outside China have been very apparent in what 
has been produced in this time.2 And despite a good deal of 
discussion of general categories and ideas in the writing of social 
history, the orthodoxy of the fifties still acts as a further limitation 
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on the range of historical ideas which can be developed.
1 
The necessity of conforming to a formula wtiich requires 
acknowledging a very long feudal period in Chinese history has 
led to the category "feudal" itself becoming increasingly irrelevant 
for serious historical study. Used as rough shorthand, or defined 
extremely vaguely, the "feudal" label often offers almost no 
guidance to the contents of the historical bottle. Nevertheless, 
the historical world in China has not been without attempts to 
provide more adequately specified - and conceptually defensible 
- accounts of the term. The problem was recently addressed by 
one of the foremost social historians of China, Fu Yiling, in terms 
which seem to me to be of considerable general interest: 
Foreign scholars have raised the question of the definition 
of the term "feudalism". In their view, the concept of 
"the feudal system" does not have to do solely with the 
economy, but includes within its scope notions to do with 
politics and law, such as the dispersal of political and 
administrative power, the warrior tradition, relations of 
dependency between lords and their followers, the concept 
of vendetta, and so on. Accordingly, they propose that 
we should speak of "traditional society" rather than a 
long-lasting "feudal society" in China. 
In my opinion, when Chinese historians use the term 
"feudal society", they are generally considering matters 
from the point of" view of the ownership system. They 
mean to refer to a set of production relations established 
by a situation in which the landlord class owns the land 
- the means of production - and the peasants own no land. 
Such a feudal society is marked, basically, by a natural 
economy. At times, commodity production for commercial 
exchange may exist, but it is secondary, acting as a 
supplement to the economic system of the landlords. Chinese 
historians .~?-re generally in agreement in using such a concept 
to mark out feudal society. There are still many points 
of debate, however, because the concrete phenomena of 
China's historical development are complex, and the stages 
of development of various economic and social factors 
cannot be separated from each other.3 
There are some very noticeable oddities in Fu's proposed analysis 
of feudalism. Neither "natural economy", nor a situation in which 
a landlord class owns all the land and the peasants none, corresponds 
to the situation which obtained in China after the tenth century 
A.D. Fu Yiling's own work has helped to make these points clearer, 
and one wonders whether his definition is offered seriously. With 
some adjustment for these objections, however, Fu suggests a 
definition which seems to me to be quite clear and consistent: 
the term refers to a society in which land, as the major productive 
resource, is worked by peasant cultivators most of whom do not 
own more than a portion of their land but rent it, or farm it subject 
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to considerable compulsory dues payable to landowners. There 
may be some doubt about applying such a definition to China at 
some periods (between the sixth and eighth centuries, for example). 
It is quite certainly applicable to others, and especially to the 
period from 850 to 1950. The problem of course, is that it is also 
applicable to a large number of other societies as well, a number 
so large, indeed, as to make its value as a term of historical analysis 
rather doubtful. The scale, the form and the distribution of 
landownership, as well as its connexion with the rest of the social 
and political order vary so widely across such societies that 
landowning of itself provides only a very imprecise classification. 
As a result, a model based on it will carry little explanatory value. 
On the other hand, the various legal and political criteria Fu 
cites from his foreign sources have their own problems. If we 
take them singly, "dispersal of political and administrative power" 
clearly covers too many systems (does federalism qualify?), as 
does the notion of a warrior tradition. If we link them, putting 
together for example military tradition, dispersal of power and 
landowning to give us the specific form of the fief, or in a similar 
way specify vassalage as a key element, then we will exclude 
many societies of Europe which are normally accepted as feudal 
by historians. 4 
Two conclusions, neither of them very startling, seem to me 
to emerge from a cursory consideration of various suggested 
definitions of "feudalism". The first is that any adequate definition 
will be one which recognizes that the term as used for European 
societies refers to a range of "family resemblances" rather than 
to a single determinate criterion. A warrior aristocracy, vassalage 
and the fief, strong gradations of social status, the exercise of 
judicial and administrative power by the lords of estates, a manorial 
form of landholding and serfdom, or at least large estates and 
a very unequal distribution of landownership, an economic order 
which gives a large place to local farming for consumption locally 
without trade - none of these formulations will do by itself, but 
a society which can be characterized in a number of these ways 
will normally be accepted as feudal. Such indeterminacy may 
be messy, but it seems indispensable in the characterization of 
European feudalism. This leads me to my second conclusion. This 
is that the plausibility of various models purporting to explain 
all the features of feudal society in terms of one or two of those 
I have mentioned comes from the fact that, in the varied societies 
of feudal Europe, varied ranges of these features did go together. 
Of course, there are good reasons for this to be so. There is a 
degree of coherence about them, and some overall historical 
influences were at work. Yet none of them, it seems to me, can 
in fact be derived from another. 
What went together in Europe did not necessarily go together 
in China. The differences are what seem to me to explain the 
difference between Fu Yiling and a British Marxist historian like 
Rodney Hilton in their analyses of the Marxist use of feudalism. 
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Hilton explains the sense of the term as used by Marx and his 
followers. This is "to describe a whole social order whose principal 
feature was the domination of the rest of society by a military 
landowning aristocracy" and to understand "the essence of the 
feudal mode of production" as "the exploitative relation between 
landowners and subordinate peasants, in which the surplus beyond 
subsistence of the latter .•. is transferred under coercive sanction 
to the former. This relationship is termed 'serfdom' .•• ".5 Others 
must comment on the adequacy of Hilton's formulation. I simply 
want to emphasize that his analysis of the term includes elements 
which come from particular conditions in Europe. Fu Yiling's 
definition does apply to the later Chinese empire: Hilton's does 
not (no military domination, no aristocracy and in my opinion 
no widespread serfdom eithei'). 
A cluster of family resemblances, associated together in 
groupings derived from the specific histories of Europe and its 
regions: is there after all much reason to expect that such a concept 
will [>rove especially illuminating for the comparative study of 
other regions and cultures? Other societies, we may decide, shared 
enough of the characteristics of European feudalism to make 
the concept useful as a classification, and thus also as the beginnings 
of an explanatory model. Zhou China could possibly be thought 
to fall into this category: Japan before the Meiji period seems 
to do so more unequivocally. (If one holds the view that what 
made Europe feudal in the mediaeval period led to capitalist 
industrialization in modern times, the Japanese case might seem 
particularly important, but this proposal seems to me to have 
little concrete to recommend it.) 
Yet, is a searcn to find candidates who will fit a particular 
concept of this kind - what one might call the Cinderella's slipper 
strategy - a sensible mode of procedure for comparative study? 
It may well be thought that more abstract kinds of conceptual 
models - from economic theory, symbolic anthropology, organization 
theory, let us say - may be of more use than one whose features 
are so clearly derived from the particular experience of one group 
of societies. Yet one of the attractions of terms like "feudalism" 
- where they are used as more than rhetorical figures, "trope 
or discourse" - is paradoxically their combination of concreteness 
and generality. They identify not only a range of institutions and 
structures across society but also ways in which such institutions 
and structures cohere, form intelligible complexes. "Feudalism" 
as applied to Europe is far from being unusual in being imperfect 
both in its social coverage and in its coherence. Provided the 
term is not taken as some kind of standard of judgement, there 
may be some illumination to be gained from taking its elements, 
the range of characteristic social patterns it identifies, as setting 
an agenda of problems for the study of societies outside its original 
reference. In what ways can we see similar functions being 
performed: are there structures with some comparable features 
to those observed in Europe: what kinds of coherence can be 
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found among these elements to match that of feudal Europe? 
The risks - Procrustean distortions either gross or subtle, failure 
to attend to the specifics of our evidence in its original context 
- are clear enough. Yet it may well be argued that just such a 
use of the notion of feudalism and the concomitant comparison 
with Europe has in fact informed some of the most useful modern 
attempts to analyze Chinese society of the later Empire, and 
especially its formative period in the centuries from the mid-Tang 
through the Song. This applies not only to generalized schemes 
but also to the work of more scholarly Chinese historians like 
Quan Hansheng and Fu Yiling and to the great Japanese historians 
like Kato, Niida, Sudo and Miyazaki. 
The dominance of Japanese scholarship has been especially 
marked in the interpretation of the evidence on Song dynasty 
society. It is to this period that I would now like to turn, to give 
some concrete content to what has so far been an extremely 
abstract argument. Until very recently, Western writing on this 
subject has been very heavily dependent indeed on the Japanese 
historians I have mentioned, and their successors. It would be 
possible for me to offer here a review of the directions which 
this Japanese scholarship has taken, and a summary of the relevant 
conclusions which such work has come to. An important part 
of such a review, I am convinced, would be to show how general 
notions of feudal society, or contrasts to it, have stimulated debates 
and research on the Chinese sources and their interpretation. But 
in fact, there is already available a small number of very competent 
works in English which review, or base themselves on, this 
literature.6 What is more, it seems to me that conclusions which 
have been too readily detached from their context of evidence, 
interpretation and argument have vitiated much of the comparative 
historical writing I am acquainted with. If we treat a body of 
scholarship simply as a source of "data" we run the risk of ignoring 
the problematic quality of the process by which its generalizations 
and conclusions have been obtained. If we were to overcome 
such a risk, we might involve ourselves ii la Borges in reproducing 
verbatim the entire body of scholarship to be reviewed as well 
as the entire body of surviving evidence. All the same, though 
most of what I have to say will inevitably be generalization, based 
on secondary work, I prefer to present it in the form of an attempt 
at reviewing the sorts of evidence which are available. 
I start with a paraphrase of an account of a rather trivial law 
case:-
Around 1235 A.D., a dispute over the ownership of some land 
was brought to the magistrate's court of an unnamed county. One 
of the parties, Wu Chun, accused a certain Mr Wang of damaging 
the site of the Wu ancestral graves by digging, cutting down trees 
and filling in gravesites. His opponent, Zhuo Qingfu, accused 
Wu Chun and his brother Wu Hui of assaulting a workman, fencing 
gravesites belonging to Zhuo family, smashing a gravestone and 
not allowing a burial to take place -in effect, of continuing trespass 
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on the land used for burials by the Zhuo family. Since the matter 
had proved too difficult to resolve at the level of community 
arbitration, and since the evidence which the two parties brought 
to court was not sufficient to settle the matter, the court was 
compelled to undertake an on-the-spot investigation before making 
a decision on the claims which each side had presented. The county 
registrar travelled to the area involved, the group of hills known 
collectively as Daguang. In his report, he noted the general 
topography, the major landmarks and the location of the Wu and 
Zhuo family properties. The land in dispute was in the north of 
the Daguang hills, just to the south of a point where there was 
a branch in a stream. 
In Zhuo Qinfu's statement, which he supported by documents, 
he asserted that in an earlier generation of Wu Chun's family, 
two of its members, Wu Wusi and Wu Nianqi, had been tenant 
farmers on Zhuo family land. In 1196, as the result of a request 
made by these two members of the Wu family, who had no land 
where they could bury their grandfather, the Zhuo family had 
given them one gravesite, just to the east of the hill on which 
there were the Zhuo family's own ancestral graves. The agreement 
had spelt out that there were to be no encroachments beyond 
the plot that had specifically been assigned to the Wu's. 
Wu Chun countered by presenting a land-deed (qi) in the name 
of Wu Cheng, which recorded a payment of two strings of cash 
for the purchase from a certain Jian Yan of a tract of hill land, 
described in terms of landmarks which certainly made it relevant 
to the area in dispute. A map was produced to back up this 
document. Wu Chun claimed that in the time since this sale -
more than half a century - five of his forebears had been buried 
there, and the proper graveyard trees had been planted and grown 
to maturity. 
When the country registrar arrived in the area, his first move 
was to call together the headmen of local "watches (bao)". Then, 
with the litigants, the whole group climbed the hill to investigate 
the facts about the site in dispute. It was found that on the northern 
hills of Daguang, there was one Wu family grave. Some thirty 
metres to the east, there was one old grave, with a newly-dug 
grave agreed to have been put in by Zhuo Qingfu close to its eastern 
side. For about twenty metres around the Wu family grave, there 
was no trace of anything which could have been five more graves, 
and also no gravesite which had been filled in. This impression 
was confirmed by careful questioning of the local people, whose 
account of things was unanimous. Wu Chun maintained that these 
witnesses had been bribed by the Zhuo family. When he suggested 
his own close neighbour, Wei Qiqi, as the only trustworthy witness, 
the registrar had him brought. His answers proved to be in accord 
with those of the other witnesses. In the registrar's view, the 
Wu brothers betrayed themselves at this point by exchanging guilty 
looks and breaking into a frightened sweat. 
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After his report on the investigation on the spot, the registrar 
submitted his opinion on the case. In it, he begins by making clear 
how much he dislikes people like the Wu brothers, whom he sees 
as nouveaux riches prepared to use their new resources for entirely 
mercenary and unprincipled ends. For the prospering Wu's and 
the declining Zhuo•s, "landlord and tenant have reversed their 
relative status", and the Wu brothers have planned a series of 
usurpations, quite without regard for the favour that Zhuo Qingfu's 
scholarly (ru) and humane (ren) ancestor once did for their family. 
Reversal of fortunes is of course simply the way things happen, 
and had the Zhuo family not had the foresight to keep officially 
stamped documents, there would have been no case to bring to 
court. But once investigated, the case shows clear evidence of 
fraud by the Wu's. In fact, it is plain that the whole of Wu Chun's 
case is a tissue of lies. On his map, he has switched the cardinal 
directions and distorted distances, as may be found from checking 
it on the spot. He has lied about his ancestor, claiming he was 
a watch headman, and not a tenant of the Zhuo's, and about the 
grave, which he claims is purchased family property rather than 
a gift. As for his claim that the land has been in his family for 
more than fifty years, this is not convincing even for the land 
the family does seem to have title to. The only date on the deed 
of sale between Wu Cheng and Jiang Yen is 1223, the date of 
the official tax receipt which has been stamped on it. Are we 
to believe that the document existed, but was unvalidated, for 
some forty years? And in any case, the boundaries described 
in the document (west to county sheriff Zhuo's land, south to the 
oxpath and sheriff Zhuo's hill) do not include the disputed land. 
The registrar's report concludes with his recommendation 
about the decision in the case, which was to be made formally 
by the magistrate back in the county seat. All the disputed land 
with the exception of the single Wu grave should go to the Zhuo's 
to be divided among descendants in accordance with normal 
inheritance rules. Wu Hui and Wu Chen are guilty of assault causing 
actual bodily harm, trespass and interference with another family's 
graveyards, disrespect for the social order, and an attempt to 
deceive the court with the false map. They should each be 
sentenced to sixty strokes of the heavy bamboo, they should forfeit 
the money they put up as pledge when they first brought the case, 
and if they again brought an ill-based case to court, their record 
should be held against them in any assessment of penalties. 
This report was submitted to Magistrate Zhao at the county 
yamen (office). After writing a brief review of the case, including 
some details different from those found in the registrar's report, 
he commended the accuracy and detail of the registrar's work 
and proceeded to give his judgement. The Wu brothers were guilty 
of trespass and assault as defined by the statutes, and were to 
be given sixty strokes of the bamboo, as was appropriate to the 
"light penalty" areas of the empire [the actual number of strokes 
given will have been much smaller, probably thirteen]. For the 
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rest, the advice given by the registrar was followed. 7 
This small piece of evidence, of course, is of little use on its 
own. But nevertheless it does provide some pointers on a number 
of relevant themes. First and perhaps most obvious is the exercise 
of judicial and administrative authority by the magistrate and 
his subordinate. Regulations governing the functions of the 
magistrate (subprefect) are preserved both in edited form in 
historical works and in contemporary administrative documents 
and handbooks issued by the central government. They were entirely 
civilian officers appointed centrally, their terms were normally 
from three to five years, and the regulations provide that their 
judicial administration was to be subject to quite close supervision. 
They were responsible for general administration of their areas, 
and in particular for tax-collection, judicial affairs and keeping 
the peace, this last with the aid of a patrolling police officer 
and a small squad of troops. General treatments of the judicial 
functions of the imperial magistrate often suggest that disputes 
of a civil kind - the sort represented by the case under discussion 
- were very rarely brought to the magistrate's court, and were 
settled instead, often relying on local custom, by such local figures 
as lineage or village heads. In this period (Song) there is enough 
evidence to show that the courts expected to, and did, hear 
considerable numbers of cases of this kind, and that mediation 
regularly proved ineffective. It is worth noting that neither in 
this case nor in any other is there question of any court other 
than that of the magistrate or his superior at the prefectural 
capital being involved with the case. The law which was 
administered was that laid down nationally from the centre, and 
if I read the evidence rightly, the magistrate is rather more careful 
than the registrar in citing the statutes which he applies in this 
case. In terms of the formal structure of administration, the 
whole system clearly represents a strong contrast to the 
characteristic decentralized pattern associated with feudalism, 
a pattern in which a multiplicity of courts existed, in which a 
good deal of the law administered by many of them derived from 
custom rather than from national legal enactment, and in which 
the keeping of the peace was a matter directly for the local lord 
rather than for an appointed official. 
Song centralization was real, but it had its limits. In this case 
we find the registrar - one of only five or six centrally appointed 
officials in the county - making his own journey to the hills to 
check the facts and consult the local people. It needs to be borne 
in mind that the case is drawn from a collection of model decisions 
by famous judges. Personal attention of this kind could not have 
been provided regularly by the ranking officials from the county 
town. For the regular conduct of official business, the magistrate 
had to depend on a far larger group of people than simply his 
colleagues in the national civil service. And the human resources 
available to these men consisted entirely of local people. There 
was an office staff, numbering up to a hundred or more, men whose 
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posts were often handed down from father to son and who lived 
by small administrative fees and bribes. Handbooks of advice 
to local government officials include investigation and control 
of the yamen staff as a first priority, and it was clearly a difficult 
task. When the Southern Song writer and official Ye Shi (1149-1223) 
writes, "Nowadays people say ••. 'There may not be fengjian 
("feudalism") for the ranking officials, but there is for the office 
staff', and they're right",s his meaning is simply the permanence 
and hereditary quality of so much of the subordinate clerical staff, 
despite their low official status. Nevertheless, his comment should 
alert us to the danger of confining our attention to formal 
administrative structures when considering the relation between 
centrally and locally defined systems of power. 
Local influence of course went far beyond the indispensable 
yamen staff and its ties of influence and corruption. For a range 
of local tasks - keeping tax registers and collecting tax, keeping 
the peace on the very local level - only people in the countryside 
itself rather than the county town were of use, and differing systems 
of local servicemen and village heads were used. Posts such as 
village head were ambiguous for those concerned. A certain degree 
of power and standing, the possibility of a strategic position linking 
yamen and village, had to be set against the personal liability 
which could, for example, spell ruin if the tax demands from the 
county seat failed to be met. The posts were meant to go to the 
wealthier households on the local scene. Of course, those with 
real wealth, landlords with land enough for hundreds of tenant 
families, would never find themselves in such positions, though 
they did pay substitutes to free them from such service. Their 
wealth gave them other sources of influence, and their 
responsibilities were negotiated at a higher level. Two poems 
from different periods on country life help to set this scene: 
Pressing for taxes, Fan Chengda (1126-1193) 
The taxes are paid, receipts brought home: now the county 
is pressing for more. 
The village head comes lurching up to bang at the door. 
Papers in hand, he's a mixture of blu:;ter and :;rniles:-
"I've just come to find a drink or two." 
At the head of the bed, a money-jar the size of a fist: 
It's broken open - just three hundred cash. 
"There's not enough here for us to get drunk on; 
I can pay you enough for the wear on your shoes!"9 
Village magnate, Mei Yaochen (1002-1060) 
Every day the harvest drum beats: 
It's a great year, he keeps on saying. 
Newbrewed wine is poured in floods 
And the grain fills up his river barges. 
His daughter's hairdo's full of silver clasps: 
His son's fur coat is soft and new. 
No questions for him from the village wardens-
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To deal with him, who could trust in government 
powers?lO 
For the magistrate and his colleagues in local government, 
office staff and village functionaries were of course inferiors 
to be controlled, rather than associates. The natural social 
reference group for magistrates in local society were the prominent 
local families. If we are to believe a constant refrain through 
Song writing on social subjects this did not mean those whose 
attention went directly to money-making - Mei's village magnate, 
or those engaged in "land-grabbing (jianbing)". It certainly did 
mean those with enough landed property for a respectable leisured 
life-style and the acquisition of cultural capital. Under the last 
two imperial dynasties, from about 1400 on, formal government 
recognition of literary learning through the empire-wide 
examination system gave such immediate access to powers of 
social command that graduates of the higher examinations who 
had never held office could nevertheless gain a fair proportion 
of their livelihood by taking positions of local leadership and 
managing or directing local bodies and activities. Under the Song, 
the examinations were less systematized, though examination 
progress was still followed with great attention by upper class 
families. Despite evidence of a fair degree of general social 
mobility, it is also clear that the position of some powerful families 
able to exploit some combination of land, commerce and educational 
tradition was strong enough to be preserved for centuries. 
The administrative system was itself at the opposite pole from 
feudal decentralization. The laws and regulations it enforced 
were enacted and regularly revised at the centre. The interests 
of the state and its servants by no means always coincided with 
those of the locally powerful. Yet the local staff and their mode 
of operation, and the social context within which the magistrates 
related to local society, made for a much stronger tug toward 
locally established social position than the formal administrative 
structure suggests. 
A marked emphasis on divisions of social status runs through 
a good deal of Song comment and enactment on social matters. 
The very small section of the population which belonged to "official 
families" were the chief beneficiaries, but there was a more 
pervasive sense of social rank. One clearly should not exaggerate 
this. The emphasis given in the case of "Wu vs. Zhuo" to the 
importance of status relations between tenant and master obviously 
implies no permanent system of aristocratic - nor of serf-like 
- rank. Nevertheless, it is common enough for relations between 
tenant and landlord to be referred to in terms of the proper 
subordination of servant to master. Though neither servants nor 
tenants carried any legal stigma which might be considered 
comparable to unfree status, there was clearly a marked emphasis 
on superior and inferior social rank in Song society as there was 
on authority relations within the family. One may question, perhaps, 
the degree of deference which existed among -tenants to be made 
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for landlord-tenant relations as well. By 1090, formal reduction 
by one degree from the normal punishment was enacted for all 
killings of tenants by landowners save deliberate homicide. Tenants 
killing a landlord were to have their punishment increased by 
one degree. Such differences were widened by later legislation, 
and to them were added laws setting heavier penalties than normal 
for servan-ts or tenants having sexual relations with members 
of their master's or landlord's family. There has been a good deal 
of debate among historians about the significance of these 
enactments and about the degree to which they were put into 
practice, and the evidence does not seem entirely conclusive) I 
Taking all in all, there is much clear evidence of the reality 
of concepts of social ranking in Song society. Yet equally clearly 
one's ranking was not lifelong or inescapable, a good deal of social 
mobility was taken for granted, and the legal differences and 
privileges incorporated in the formal code were important, but 
much too specific and limited to constitute a "society of orders". 
Not a great deal about the crucial question of landed property 
can be gleaned from the case of Wu vs. Zhuo. But it does make 
clear that there was a general recognition of strong property 
rights in land, transferable by sale, and a system of official 
registration (and taxation) of contracts for private dealings in 
land, which served as the basis for the legal settlement of disputes. 
Neither in this case, nor in any others dealing with land transfers, 
is there any mention of the persistence of any dues or payments, 
the rights to which are not transferred along with the sale of 
the land itself. This excludes, of course, national taxes, which 
were paid to the local government offices or to the village headmen. 
They were usually, though not invariably, assessed on, and paid 
by, the landowner. Owners of even moderate-sized estates, 
however, often had their taxes paid by agents, and collusion between 
these agents and the local yamen staff could mean that people 
supposedly acting as tax collectors lent their support to the 
machinery of private rent collection.l2 
The question of the landed estate is one of the more difficult 
ones in interpreting the sources on Song society. It is quite clear 
from both particular cases and the surviving census figures that 
there was a substantial number of small farmers owning their 
own land. These families might have more than one plot or combine 
working their own land with renting an extra amount where they 
had enough labour to do so. This pattern in outline is familiar 
from what we know of the last centuries of the prerevolutionary 
land system. One of the clearest achievements of Japanese 
scholars, especially Kato Shigeshi and Sudo YoshiyUI<i, however, 
has been to demonstrate the very high frequency of large, 
sometimes very large, holdings of land; regularly known as 
zhuangyuan, in the Song and the immediately preceding period. 
Zhuangyuan is a word which suffers badly from the problem of 
translation. First, the word was taken over very early by the 
Japanese, pronounced as shoen, to denote a form of landed estate 
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which, while in its or1gms and its internal organization it had 
many similarities with Tang-Song zhuangyuan, took on a very 
different character because of its role in the decay of central 
government authority and the rise of the local military. Then, 
when acquaintance with European history brought the need for 
a word to translate the English manor and its European equivalents, 
it was naturally zhuangyuan or shoen which was chosen. 
The word manor is often used to imply that the estate concerned 
is organized as a unit, both geographically and in terms of the 
management of production. It is as well to remember that this 
was not so in Japan, and that in the opinion of many historians 
it was perhaps exceptional in European feudal society as well. 
In the words of Postan, "In fact, the only European region in which 
the feudal landlords operated as largescale producers was eastern 
Europe of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries".13 
In the case of Song China there is a great deal of disagreement 
in the literature precisely over the questions of how far the 
zhuangyuan is properly to be seen as one consolidated holding, 
and of how far it is true to say that it was worked as a productive 
unit. Kato and Sudo see Song zhuangyuan as consisting mainly 
of such geographical and organizational units, and the best-known 
study in English on this subject follows their lead to such a degree 
that its author entitles his account "Manorialism without 
Feudalism ".14 
Questions of this kind (what pattern was predominant?) can 
hardly be answered by anything but a complete survey of all our 
evidence, and quite possibly not even then. For a number of reasons, 
there is far less surviving evidence on the management of private 
landholdings in China than seems to be available for some European 
mediaeval and early modern societies. My own impression leads 
me to agree with the critics of Sudo's and Kato's view of the 
zhuangyuan as a productive unit. It is not difficult to find accounts 
of zhuangyuan which were not under a unified management: neither 
is it difficult to find recordswhich clearly show a dispersed pattern 
of landholding. It is a good deal rarer to find unambiguous records 
which demonstrate the existence of "manors". 
In the essays of the Northern Song statesman and author Ouyang 
Xiu (1007-1072) there is the following passage:-
Nowadays, one household whose holdings reach one hundred 
.9!.!:!g_ [13.9 acres to the qing: 100 was a moderately large 
holding for [the] Song [period] and would have been a very 
large one indeed in later periods] may have around fifty 
tenant families. Those among them who work the owner's 
fields, using their own or the owner's ox and dividing their 
return with the owner will number perhaps a dozen or so 
families. The rest are all "floating tenants" [fuke, used 
to refer to tenants who have brought no resources of their 
own]. These live on the landlord's land, paying a fixed 
rent, and some of them will be farming poor land. These 
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families have never been wealthy enough to amass reserves. 
When they are not able to pay for marriages, funerals or 
the spring and autumn festivals, or are unable to cope with 
famine or taxation, they borrow from the landlord, sometimes 
at 100 or 200 per cent interest. At harvest time, once 
seeq and tax are deducted, the crop is divided up, and 
sometimes the whole of a tenant's crop is not enough to 
pay a debt contracted at 200 per cent. He may finish 
threshing the crop in the morning and have his family going 
hungry that same evening. So he takes another loan. In 
winter or spring he borrows so as to have food, pledging 
to repay wheat in summer. When his wheat all goes in 
repayment, then in summer or autumn he pledges to repay 
rice in winter. Families like this eat only by borrowing. 
And so the produce of a hundred qing goes to the landlord's 
family alone.l5 
It is apparent that this was not the result of a statistical survey 
of rural conditions. Ouyang's picture is an attack on the 
accumulation of land by the wealthy (jianbing) - a constant theme 
among reform minded Confucians from his time on - and it is 
part of a general essay on "three abuses" (too many soldiers, too 
many monks, too much jianbing). Nevertheless, it is clearly meant 
to be understood as referring to what Ouyang took to be a typical 
estate, and it is not one in which the landlord is playing any 
entrepreneurial or managing role beyond provision of an ox, perhaps 
tools and seed - and loans. If such an estate happens to be 
geographically united, this does not change the fact that it is 
worked entirely as a collection of small household farms. And, 
in fact, specifications of landholding in private estates for which 
we have records show many examples of estates in which the 
parcels of land were dispersed, if not to the extreme degree which 
became common in some areas later. 
There certainly do exist records of continuous landholdings 
- some of them being of very great size indeed. There are also 
a few direct references to smaller estates being worked on as 
units, where particular circumstances existed - on lakeside land 
which needed regular labour for drainage, for example. And the 
organization of local canals, irrigation ditches, dams and the like 
may have been handled by landlords or their agents in some places. 
The main body of evidence which has been presented to show 
overall management of estates, however, is the very large number 
of references to estate supervisors and agents in a variety of 
sources. These men, called by various names but . by Southern 
Song times known generically simply as agents (ganren), were 
a major presence on the Song rural scene. They were indispensable 
to the landlords - especially the fair proportion of them who lived 
in town - though their own status in relation to the landlord himself 
was not very much higher than that of the tenants. The sources 
detailing their activities are very disparate. They are shown 
collecting rents, "supervising the harvest" (probably in particular 
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checking the crops of sharecroppers), arranging for tax collections, 
organizing the transport of rent grain to warehouses and supervising 
its storage, organizing the shipping of grain out to market. If 
this is what is understood as "managing the estate as an economic 
unit", then the complexity of the tasks the agents undertook is 
probably enough to justify the term. But such "management" is 
quite compatible with a view of_ the typical Song estate as an 
agglomeration of peasant households, paying rent in kind, using 
such common facilities as irrigation channels and threshing floors, 
but planning their own plantings, directing their own labour force, 
and using their own profits, if they were fortunate enough, to 
acquire land themselves or to move into trade - in short, running 
their own small household economy. 
lt may well be that neither feudal Europe nor Song China had 
many estates on which "management" went much beyond the sort 
of role played by the Song "agents". The landed estates of both 
societies, in any event, were capable of supplying a commercial 
market on some fair scale, and of specializing when economic 
opportunity presented itself. Given the nature of Chinese 
agriculture - the much smaller place it gave to animals, the 
intensive quality of rice-farming, the use of silk or hemp (not 
yet cotton) as textile fibres - specialization did not require or 
often produce entire estates or areas in which a single commercial 
crop dominated production completely, though lacquer and tea 
plantations certainly existed. 
On the whole, the scale and distribution of landed property, 
though not perhaps its form, in Song China bears far more 
resemblance to that of feudal Europe than might be suggested 
either by the much less uneven distribution of land in later periods 
in China, or by an oversimplified notion of European "manorialism". 
In Europe, the pattern of great estates persisted for many centuries. 
In China, the productivity of small-scale labour-intensive 
rice-farming, the ability of the state to limit and manage local 
social position and the lack of primogeniture all influenced 
development toward dispersal of large holdings over the centuries 
after the thirteenth century, as the population grew. 
Over one particular element in the pattern or relationships 
within the Song zhuangyuan there has been an extraordinary amount 
of debate among historians. This is the question of whether Song 
tenants were comparable to serfs, how dependent and unfree their 
social position was. Its importance for Japanese scholars has 
come about partly because they have seen it as crucially relevant 
to assessing the so-called "Naito hypothesis": that Song China 
saw a great shift in the direction of "modernity". Debates between 
historians associated with the "Kyoto School", supporting Naito, 
and the "Tokyo School" who opposed him, have managed to define 
social and economic issues which have given much fuller meaning 
to the original rather vague suggestion by Naito Torajiro. The 
question of tenancy was developed and debated in this context. 
Serf-like conditions - "feudal subordination" - were clearly not 
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compatible with "modernity", whether that notion involved replacing 
"personal coercion" by the cash nexus, or substituting "contract" 
for "status". 
As happens often enough, the course of the debate has made 
clear that the specific points which remain at issue will not really 
bear the significance that has been attributed to them. As I have 
already mentioned, it is generally agreed that there was a strong 
sense of social hierarchy in Song society, and that this was embodied 
in the law covering criminal offences between landlords and tenants. 
But it is also agreed that the inferior status of servant or tenant 
(both of whom were legally classified as "honourable {liangmin)" 
was not a permanent or hereditary legal condition. Contracts 
of tenancy and loan agreements - sometimes very harshly enforced 
- are recognized as having been the means by which landlords 
extracted income from their tenants. Yet the high rates of rent 
and interest, the lack of sources of livelihood other than farming, 
and the costs of mobility made it difficult for tenants to break 
away from economic dependency. Security of tenure was the 
concern for many, perhaps most, rather than the right to leave 
one's landlord. The exhortation to the peasants by a county 
magistrate, which I have quoted above, admonishes tenants: 
You must not defy your landlord, or detain him against 
his will, for thus you will avoid having people come to inspect 
your affairs when the harvest is over and the time has 
come when tenants mal move. This is the way for you 
to care for your ~amily.l 
Different historians give different emphasis to these points. 
A more persistent disagreement over the evidence concerns the 
question of whether tenants were legally bound to the land they 
farmed - or perhaps in some cases even to its owner. The original 
disagreements in this case also have been narrowed by the course 
of the discussion. It is pretty generally accepted that regional 
differences, which were always recognized as existing, are crucially 
important in analyzing the terms of tenm·e. A quite substantial 
part of the empire is acknowledged to have been placed fairly 
early in the dynasty under a regime which explicitly permitted 
tenants not only to move, but to move, once the harvest was in, 
without the papers from the landlord which had "previously" been 
required. It is the extent to which the law was put into practice 
which is debated, though l must mention that the assumption that 
the "previous" regime was one in which the landlord had an 
acknowledged right to give or withhold permission to his tenant 
seems very unconvincing to me. In any case, it is also acknowledged 
that there are a fair number of later references to tenants leaving 
their landlords' land, which envisage no restrictions beyond the 
satisfactory completion of the harvest and the payment of rent. 
In some major areas, then, over some considerable period, no 
legal condition of being "bound to the soil" was recognized. 
Beyond this point, the disagreements persist. My own position 
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is generally one of agreement with those who are skeptical about 
the arguments for widespread serf-like tenancy. One whole 
category of official regulations which has been cited in support 
of those arguments, for example, seems to me to need considerably 
less dramatic treatment. These are the rules set to govern the 
terms under which tenants who had left their landlord could be 
legally compelled to return, and the period which was to elapse 
before the rights of the landlord expired. The term used of such 
tenants - taowang, to escape or abscond - was in regular 
administrative use at this and earlier periods for households which 
had migrated to evade taxation responsibilities. This should be 
considered together with the frequent mention of contracts in 
the material about such "absconding" tenants - sometimes originally 
refugees from war or famine. The question was whether a tenant's 
contract had been honoured, not simply whether he "belonged" 
to an estate or a landlord. Unfortunately, no tenancy contracts 
from this period survive. If those from the immediately preceding 
and following periods are an indication, however, Song contracts 
may well have carried no indication of the period to be covered, 
unlike those of the Qing and the Republican periods. If this could 
be shown to be so, it would not imply that the contracts were 
generally seen as permanent, as is shown by the material which 
does exist concerning a tenant's right to move. In fact, a general 
expectation that contracts would last a long time may have to 
do as much with the tenant's need for security as with the landlord's. 
There was a term in regular use - chandian - to indicate eviction 
of a tenant in favour of one prepared to pay a higher rent, and 
the practice was subject to official restriction. In such a situation, 
it is perhaps not surprising that it is hard to get a completely 
clear picture of how tenants' obligations might be terminated. 
But official efforts to give legal and administrative form to the 
position of tenants in this matter read far more like efforts to 
remedy abuses than attempts to alter an entire system, to "free 
the serfs". 
There are some pieces of evidence which are hard to square 
with a picture of the Song tenancy order in which there are no 
elements of personal service or subordination. There are quite 
enough records, too, to demonstrate that there was often harsh 
exploitation. But it is no longer really possible to portray Song 
tenancy in bald terms of serfdom and bondage to the soil, as did 
Mark Elvin in 1973, in his widely-read The Pattern of the Chinese 
Past - making his own task easier, it must be said, by tendentious 
translation of standard terms for "tenant" as "tenant-serf".17 
On the place of trade in Song china, matters are simpler. The 
scale and sophistication of commerce were simply of a different 
order from those of Europe in a roughly contemporary period 
(tenth to thirteenth centuries). The surprise and admiration of 
Marco Polo on visiting the cities of South China, and especially 
the former capital of the Southern Song, known to him as Qinsai 
and to the Chinese as Xingzai or Hangzhou, is well-known testimony 
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to this. It is some.times suggested that the great cities of imperial 
China owed their size and wealth solely to the presence of the 
institutions of the imperial state itself, that they functioned 
economically merely as settings for palace, barracks and 
bureaucracy. Such a view could not survive the briefest 
acquaintance with the sources available on the Song capitals and 
their provincial counterparts. Their markets and their extensive 
commercial and financial quarters were dominated by private 
traders, and were linked with the rest of the empire and beyond 
in a variety of ways. Bianliang (Kaifent) and Xiangzai, as capitals, 
of course benefitted greatly from spending and building by the 
central government, but both would have been major commercial 
centres without the presence of the court. Hangzhou, indeed, 
had a population of seven to eight hundred thousand (compared 
to around one and a half million later) before the fall of Bianliang 
to the Jin in 1127. The figures for commercial tax collection 
confirm that this population derived from Hangzhou's position 
as the major commercial city of the empire after the capital. 
The population of other towns is hard to estimate, but at least 
two other towns in the lower Yangtze valley alone had populations 
in the hundreds of thousands in the twelfth century. Neither had 
been even in the top dozen commercial cities of the empire in 
the trade tax statistics collected in 1077.18 
The bulk of trade was done at a fairly lo<'al level, through 
the growing network of market towns. Beside the old trade in 
spices, pearls and other precious items, however, there had grown 
up a substantial bulk trade in grain and in other items of daily 
use - timber, metal goods, ceramics, writing materials as well 
as other foodstuffs. The scale of this commerce was regional, 
national and in some cases international, with a substantial quantity 
of exports to south-east Asia, Japan and Korea as well as overland. 
Commercial organization, in particular partnerships, brokerage, 
warehousing and wholesaling, and the provision of credit, were 
all well developed. A quantity of reliable material is available 
in English on this subject, especially the work of Shiba Yoshinobu, 
and it is not necessary to review it further here.I9 
Song trade, of course, had its limitations. It was built on a 
productive, but labour-intensive, agriculture which combined 
very readily with a high level of household production of such 
everyday needs as textiles. Its capacity to organize and coordinate 
production seems to have been confined to a few items like 
ceramics. While the imperial state was not hostile, palace and 
bureaucracy undertook a good deal of their own procurement 
and working of goods, and channelled and circumscribed some 
of the richest commercial areas - in the salt and tea trades, for 
example. In any case, while the west European feudal economy 
never matched the scale of Song commerce, this may not have 
been true of the later east European feudalisms, which operated 
in a very different context. And Tokugawa Japan, while sharing 
many of the other social features of the "feudal" grouping, most 
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probably had a structure of commerce which took considerably 
more ~oods into higher-level trading centres than did that of Song 
China. 0 "Feudalism" as a syndrome does not necessarily include 
anything approaching a "natural economy". 
* * * * * 
I hope I have conveyed the impression that a general notion 
of feudalism, as a possible source for comparative approaches, 
has been quite useful in directing attention to a number of important 
issues in analyzing Song society. (In some cases - like that of 
serfdom - it seems to me to have been over-enthusiastically 
applied.) On the whole, though, the range of questions the 
comparison has raised has been answer·ed in ways that demonstrate 
the value of contrasts as •.vell as resemblances. Song society does 
not seem to me to have had nearly enough of the characteristic 
patterns the term covers for there to be much sense in calling 
it "feudal", but of course this is an entirely trivial observation. 
The goal of providing an agreed and settled taxonomy of social 
types, and then assigning societies to those types, does not seem 
to me to be a useful one to set for comparative history. 
Comparisons of the kind I have been trying to conduct in this 
paper are as useful as any other coherent strategies for 
interrogating the evidence we have available on historical societies. 
Where a concept, however generalized, has proved as productive 
and flexible as has "feudalism" for its original area of application, 
we may have a fair idea that it will raise interesting questions 
in another area. But of course such an approach has no privilege 
at all over any others we might adopt. Theoretical economics, 
location theory, organization theory, anthropological theories 
of kinship, symbolism, political and social exchange all may have 
their own validity as conceptual tools to compel our evidence 
to speak beyond its own terms, and in fact we may need such 
concepts even to identify what those terms are. By now, historians 
of Song society may be ready to discard "feudalism" as their mentor. 
They may learn more by attending, as some historians both of 
China and of Europe are already doing, to different, perhaps newer, 
guides. But none of these latter· themselves can be conclusive, 
and they will distort if they are taken as representing or 
reconstituting a definitive reality. The value of "social science" 
for history is to provide coherent and revealing concepts and 
questions, not to codify answers. For this purpose "feudalism" 
seems to me to have shown that, provided it is not abused, it can 
be a serviceable and workmanlike tool. 
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